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Abstract:  
 
The free movement of Union citizens hinges on three ‘classic’ requirements, namely the 
possession of Member State nationality, the inter-State element and the condition of self-
sufficiency. Recent case law of the ECJ seems to shake the traditional conceptions of these 
requirements and, as a consequence, to widen the scope of application of the free movement 
rules. This in turn will have significant consequences for the immigration laws of the 
Member States. On the one hand, Union law will increasingly influence the Member States’ 
rules on acquisition and loss of nationality. On the other hand, the Member States will have 
to accord residence rights to certain categories of Union citizens and their family members 
who would previously not have been entitled to invoke Union law. The resulting financial 
burdens for the Member States are potentially very significant, although it is not yet possible 
to ascertain the precise reach of the principles articulated by the ECJ. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: ‘CLASSIC’ ELEMENTS OF FREE MOVEMENT 
 
In the most basic terms, the right to free movement enjoyed by Union citizens is 
rather straightforward: every Union citizen is entitled to move to another Member 
State and reside there if he can prove that he is either economically active or has 
sufficient financial resources at his disposal. This general sketch already reveals that 
the free movement of Union citizens is centred on three basic elements, which can be 
labelled ‘classic’ elements of free movement. First of all, it is clear that the right to 
free movement is only enjoyed by Union citizens, i.e. persons who have acquired and 
retained the nationality of a Member State in accordance with the nationality rules 
of that Member State. Second, it can only be invoked by Union citizens once they 
leave their Member State and move to another Member State. Static Union citizens, 
i.e. Union citizens who have never resided in a Member State other than that of their 
nationality, cannot normally invoke the benefits related to the right to free 
movement. Third, Union citizens can only reside in another Member State for 
longer periods of time if they are self-sufficient, i.e. if they have a job or can fall back 
on sufficient personal means.  
 
These three classic elements are embedded in the Treaties and in secondary Union 
law, most notably Directive 2004/38, 1 and have been consistently confirmed by the 
ECJ. Nonetheless, recent case law of the ECJ seems to shake the traditional 
conceptions of these elements and to considerably reduce their importance as 
requirements for the application of the free movement rules. As a consequence, the 
scope of these rules is widened. This in turn, I will demonstrate, will have significant 
consequences for the immigration laws of the Member States. In the following, I 
briefly discuss for each of the classic elements the traditional approach and its 
underlying reasons, before analysing the recent evolution in the case law and its 
likely consequences for the immigration laws of the Member States. 
 
2. MEMBER STATE NATIONALITY 
 
2.1 Traditional Approach  
 
It follows from Article 20(1) TFEU that every national of a Member State is also a 
citizen of the Union. Traditionally, it is assumed therefore that the Member States 
autonomously determine the personal scope of Union citizenship, since the Member 
States have exclusive competence to regulate nationality. Union law, it is 
traditionally accepted, does not apply in the field of nationality legislation.  
 
The competence to lay down the rules regarding acquisition and loss of nationality 
is a key competence of sovereign States. Understandably, the Member States have 
jealously guarded this competence and have never been prepared to transfer any 
competence in this field to the EU. Precisely for this reason, the Member States 
opted in the Maastricht Treaty to define Union citizenship by reference to Member 
State nationality. As such, the Member States arguably intended to prevent Union 
citizenship from competing with or even superseding Member State nationality. 
                                                 
1  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right 
of the citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L158/77. 
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Furthermore, the Member States explicitly stipulated in a declaration annexed to the 
Treaties2 and in a decision of the Heads of State or Government meeting within the 
European Council3 that Member State nationality is to be determined solely by 
reference to the national law of the Member State concerned. Accordingly, there 
simply seemed to be no room for arguing that Union law applied in the field of 
nationality rules. 
 
Still, it must be remarked that it has been accepted for some time that Union law, 
through the provisions on Union citizenship, indirectly influences the nationality 
rules of the Member States. Even before the introduction of Union citizenship, the 
Court had proclaimed that the Member States have to respect unconditionally 
nationality measures adopted by other Member States.4 This duty of unconditional 
recognition can set in motion a subtle interplay between the Member States, 
whereby rules and practices regarding nationality in one Member State may have 
significant consequences for other Member States. Indeed, Member States with 
flexible nationality rules make it easy for third country nationals to acquire Union 
citizenship, which in turn entitles them to claim rights and benefits in all other 
Member States. For this reason, Member States with flexible rules may come under 
pressure from other Member States to restrict their rules. The most famous case in 
point is the restriction of Irish nationality rules in 2004 after the flexible Irish 
nationality laws had come under pressure in circumstances that gave rise to the Zhu 
en Chen case5.  
 
Besides, the Court had held in its Micheletti judgment, in a famous obiter dictum, that 
it is for each Member State, having due regard to Union law, to lay down the 
conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality.6 However, while in the almost 
20 years following Micheletti, the ECJ repeated this dictum in a number of cases,7 it 
had never clarified its meaning by stating what principles of Union law Member 
States must respect in this connection or found a Member State’s nationality 
legislation to be in breach of Union law. This led to a vivid debate in legal literature 
about the possible meaning and significance of the dictum.8 In its Rottmann judgment 
                                                 
2 Declaration (No 2) on nationality of a Member State, annexed to the Treaty on European Union 
[1992] OJ C191/98.  
3 Decision of the Heads of State and Government, meeting within the European Council, concerning 
certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C348/1. For a 
discussion, see Deirdre Curtin and Ronald van Ooik, ‘Denmark and the Edinburgh Summit: 
Maastricht without Tears’ in David O’Keeffe and Patrick M. Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law Publishing 1994) 349-365.  
4 This principle was articulated for the first time in Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239.  
5 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, with a case note by Kristien Vanvoorden in 
(2005) Colum. J. Eur. L. 305-321. See the discussion in Bernard Ryan, ‘The Celtic Cubs: The 
Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland’ (2004) 6 Eur. J. Migration & L. 173-193. 
6 Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239, para 10 (emphasis added). 
7 Case C-179/98 Mesbah [1999] ECR I-7955, para 29; Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237, para 
19; Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, para 37. 
8  See, for instance, the longstanding debate in the Netherlands between De Groot (see inter alia 
Gerard-René De Groot, ‘Towards a European Nationality Law’ (2004) 8.3 EJCL 
<http://www.ejcl.org/83/art83-4.PDF> and the literature cited therein) and Jessurun d’Oliveira (see 
inter alia Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Nationality and the European Union after Amsterdam’ in 
David O’Keeffe and Patrick M. Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart Publishing 
1999) 395-412). 
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of 2 March 2010,9 the ECJ for the first time clarified to some extent the meaning of 
the phrase ‘having due regard to Union law’.   
 
2.2 The Rottmann Case and its Consequences  
 
2.2.1 The Case 
 
The facts of the case are rather peculiar. Mr. Rottmann was an Austrian national 
who was prosecuted in Austria on account of suspected serious fraud in his 
profession. While the judicial investigation was ongoing, he moved to Germany and 
acquired the German nationality. When the competent German authority learned of 
the pending proceedings against Mr. Rottmann, it reacted by withdrawing his 
naturalisation with retroactive effect, considering that, by failing to disclose this 
relevant information, Mr. Rottmann had obtained the German nationality by 
deception. The withdrawal decision had rather disastrous consequences for Mr. 
Rottmann. As a consequence of his naturalisation he had lost his Austrian 
nationality, in accordance with both Austrian and German law. The withdrawal 
decision would strip him of his only remaining nationality, the German nationality. 
Consequently, the interplay of Austrian and German provisions on nationality in the 
circumstances of the case threatened10 to render Mr. Rottmann stateless. 
 
The question the ECJ had to answer was whether this outcome was in accordance 
with Union law, in particular with the provisions on Union citizenship. The Court 
started by tackling the question of admissibility, namely by determining whether 
Union law was applicable to the dispute at all.11 It famously stated that the situation 
of Mr. Rottmann fell, ‘by reason of its nature and its consequences’, within the ambit 
of Union law.12 This is a point of paramount importance to which I will come back in 
more detail below.13 Next, the Court assessed whether the withdrawal decision was 
taken in accordance with Union law.14 The Court accepted that withdrawal of 
nationality for reasons of deception could be compatible with Union law, since such 
corresponds to a reason relating to the public interest, namely the protection of the 
special relationship of solidarity and good faith between a Member State and its 
nationals. It added, however, that, where the withdrawal of nationality has for a 
consequence that the person concerned loses his Union citizenship, this decision 
must respect the principle of proportionality. It was necessary, therefore, to balance 
the consequences of the withdrawal decision for the person concerned and his or her 
family members with regard to the loss of the rights enjoyed by every Union citizen 
against the gravity of the offence committed by that person, the lapse of time 
between the naturalisation decision and the withdrawal decision and the possibilities 
for that person to recover his original nationality.   
 
 
2.2.2 Analysis 
                                                 
9 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, with case notes by Dimitry Kochenov in (2010) 47 
CML Rev. 1831-1846; Nathan Cambien in (2011) 17 Colum. J. Eur. L. 375-394. 
10 The effects of the withdrawal decision were suspended by the appeal brought against it by Mr. 
Rottmann. Accordingly, the effects of the decision under Austrian and German law had not yet 
materialised when the ECJ delivered its judgment. 
11 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, paras 37-45. 
12 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, para 42. 
13 See under III.B.1, infra. 
14 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, paras 46-59. 
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a. Nationality Rules within the Scope of Union Law  
 
In Rottmann the Court for the very first time directly assessed Member State 
nationality rules in the light of Union law. The Court justified its competence for 
carrying out this validity assessment by pointing at the intrinsic link between 
Member State nationality and Union citizenship. Every national measure entailing 
the loss of Union citizenship automatically entails for the person concerned the loss 
of his most fundamental status under Union law15 and has for a consequence that 
this person can no longer exercise his citizenship rights in the different Member 
States. Consequently, such a decision will fall ‘by reason of its nature and its 
consequences’ within the scope of Union law. This justification seems to confirm the 
expectation that the Court will henceforth be prepared to screen Member State rules 
and decisions on loss of Member State nationality. This will probably be different 
only in cases where the person losing his Member State nationality preserves or at 
the same time acquires the nationality of another Member State because under such 
circumstances there will be no impact on the Union citizen status of that person. 
 
An important question left unanswered by the Rottmann judgment is whether the 
Court’s reasoning should be confined to cases of loss of nationality or should be held 
equally applicable in cases of acquisition of nationality, or the refusal thereof.16 By its 
very nature, the acquisition of Member State nationality confers upon an individual 
the most fundamental status of nationals of the Member States17 and this 
automatically has Union wide consequences, in the sense that the person concerned 
will be entitled to exercise certain rights in all Member States. Accordingly, cases of 
acquisition of Member State nationality now arguably fall within the scope of Union 
law to the extent that they entail Union citizenship. Matters are less clear-cut in 
case of decisions refusing the grant of Member State nationality. On the one hand, 
such decisions clearly have consequences that go beyond the remit of the Member 
State concerned. Indeed, where an individual is denied the nationality of a Member 
State, this has for a consequence that he will not be able to enjoy the rights attached 
to Union citizenship. These are the very same rights that a Member State national 
would lose if his (only) Member State nationality were to be withdrawn. On the 
other hand, it is not possible to argue that a decision refusing nationality impacts 
negatively on the citizenship rights of the person concerned, for the simple reason 
that this person will never have enjoyed these rights in the first place. 18 Be that as it 
may, once it is agreed that the Member States’ rules on acquisition of nationality 
come under the scrutiny of Union law, it would be somewhat illogical to distinguish 
between conferral and refusal of nationality, since the very same rules will embody 
the criteria that determine both.   
 
                                                 
15 According to settled case law, Union citizenship is ‘destined to be’ or ‘intended to be’ the most 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States (see eg Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR 
I-6193, para 31). 
16 See the discussion in Gareth T. Davies, ‘The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship 
and rights’ (2010) EUDO Citizenship Forum <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-forum/254-
has-the-european-court-of-justice-challenged-member-state-sovereignty-in-nationality-
law?start=2>. 
17 Except, of course, where the person concerned already possessed the nationality of a Member State. 
18 This accords with the reasoning followed in Case C-192/99 Kaur [2001] ECR I-1237. In that case, 
the Court considered that the non-conferral of Union citizenship on the applicant was valid because 
there was no question of any deprivation of rights under Union law since those rights had never 
arisen in the first place. 
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In conclusion, it arguably follows from the Rottmann judgment that the Member 
States’ competence regarding both acquisition and loss of nationality falls within the 
scope of Union law to the extent that it has an impact on the status of Union 
citizenship.19 This broad interpretation of the scope of Union law finds some support 
in the wording of the Rottmann judgment. The famous Micheletti dictum, which is 
cited by the Court, refers to the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality. 
Besides, the Court in Rottmann held that the principles announced in the judgment 
apply to both the Member State of naturalisation and the Member State of the 
original nationality.20 One could deduce from this that a possible refusal of the 
Austrian authorities to grant or revive Mr. Rottmann’s Austrian nationality will 
only be valid if it is in accordance with fundamental principles of Union law. Future 
case law will have to clarify this point. 
 
b. Limitations Deriving from Union Law  
 
In Rottmann the Court for the very first time gave concrete guidance on the 
significance and scope of its Micheletti dictum, as far as the conditions for loss of 
Member State nationality are concerned. The Court explained that such conditions 
have to be in accordance with the principle of proportionality, which requires a 
delicate balancing act between the interests of the Member State and those of the 
individual concerned.21 The scope and effect of this limitation will depend on how 
stringently it is applied, a task which pertains first and foremost to the national 
courts of the Member States. It is submitted that it is probably only in extreme 
cases, i.e. where the interests of the individual manifestly outweigh those of the 
Member State concerned, that the principle of proportionality can be considered to 
be violated. Such would seem necessary in order to safeguard the Member States’ 
principled competence in the field of nationality. Safeguarding that competence is 
arguably also necessary to protect the national identities of the Member States,22 
given that nationality is without any doubt one of the elements central to that 
identity. In any event, a Member State is not obliged to refrain from withdrawing its 
nationality merely because the person concerned has not recovered the nationality of 
his Member State of origin. At the same time, the principle of proportionality may 
require the person concerned to be afforded a reasonable period of time in order to 
try to recover the nationality of his Member State of origin. 23 
 
In Rottmann the Court only explicitly mentioned the principle of proportionality as a 
limitation deriving from Union law. However, other general principles of Union law 
could equally serve as limitations to the Member States’ competence regarding 
nationality, as was observed by AG Poiares Maduro in his Opinion in the case.24 In 
particular, the duty to respect fundamental rights25, the principle of legitimate 
                                                 
19 See in that sense Davies (n 16).  
20 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, paras 60-64. 
21 The principle of proportionality is a general principle of Union law which also figures in art 52(1) 
of the Charter of fundamental rights. See the discussion in Koen Lenaerts and Piet Van Nuffel (Robert 
Bray and Nathan Cambien (eds)), European Union Law (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 141ff. 
22 See art 4(2) TEU, which provides that the ‘Union shall respect the equality of Member States 
before the Treaties as well as their national identities’. This provision was explicitly relied upon by 
the Court in order to justify a rather broad construction of Member State competence (see Case C-
208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein (ECJ, 22 December 2010), para 92). 
23 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, paras 57-58. 
24 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, paras 29-32. 
25 See art 6(3) TEU and art 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. For a discussion, see 
Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 21), 821ff. 
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expectations26 and the freedom of movement and residence27 could act as limitations 
in a way similar to the principle of proportionality. The principle of legitimate 
expectations and the duty to respect fundamental rights could even be said to ‘feed’ 
the principle of proportionality in the sense that a measure concerning nationality 
will be more likely to be disproportionate if it infringes one of them. The freedom of 
movement and residence, for its part, could be violated if a Member State’s 
nationality law were to provide that nationals of that Member State would lose their 
nationality after having lived in another Member State during a certain period of 
time.28 It will be for the Court to clarify the precise scope and meaning of these 
principles in this context. 
 
Another principle which may be very important in this context is the principle of 
sincere cooperation.29 That principle might require the Member States to take 
account of each other’s nationality rules and the combined effect they may have for 
an individual in particular circumstances.30 In this connection, it must be remarked 
that the referring court in the Rottmann case has in the meantime ruled that the 
German withdrawal of nationality was in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality and therefore valid.31 One may wonder whether the Austrian 
authorities are under an obligation to take into account that Mr. Rottmann has now 
definitively lost his German nationality and are, on that ground, obliged to revive 
his Austrian nationality and his Union citizenship.32 Sincere cooperation in this 
sense would enable Germany to apply the provisions of its nationality law while 
avoiding the definitive loss of Mr. Rottmann’s Union citizenship33 and, as such, be 
apt to further the aims of the provisions on Union citizenship.34   
 
2.3 Consequences for the Member States’ Immigration Laws  
 
The foregoing makes it clear that it can no longer be doubted that the nationality 
rules of the Member States have to be in accordance with a number of fundamental 
principles of Union law. This requirement evidently has consequences for the 
immigration laws and policies of the Member States, since the criteria for granting 
                                                 
26 There is a large body of case law mentioning the principle of legitimate expectations as a general 
principle of Union law. See eg Joined Cases C-181/04 to C-183/04, Elmeka, [2006] ECR I-8167, para 
31. For a discussion, see Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 
251ff. 
27 See art 21(1) TFEU. For a discussion, see Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 21), 184-189. 
28 Gerard-René De Groot, ‘The Relationship between the Nationality of the Member States of the 
European Union and European Citizenship’ in Massimo La Torre (ed), European Citizenship: an 
Institutional Challenge (Kluwer Law International 1998) 136-139. 
29 See art 4(3) TEU. For a discussion, see Lenaerts and Van Nuffel (n 21), 147ff. 
30 See in this connection Case C-165/91 van Munster [1994] ECR I-4661, in which the Court held 
that the principle of sincere cooperation may require a Member State, when applying its legislation, 
to take into account the legislative provisions of another Member State. 
31 BVerwG 5 C 12.10., Judgment of 11 November 2010. 
32 The BundesverwaltungsGericht in fact explicitly made a suggestion in this sense (Case C-135/08 
Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, para 34).  
33 Somewhat ironically, it would seem that better coordination between the Austrian and German 
authorities would have prevented the possibility of Mr. Rottmann losing his Union citizenship in the 
first place. If the Austrian authorities had been quicker to inform the German authorities about the 
pending criminal proceedings against Mr. Rottmann, the latter would presumably never have 
acquired the German nationality at all.  
34 AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer has remarked that ‘Citizenship of the Union…must at least guarantee 
that it is possible to change nationality within the European Union without suffering any legal 
disadvantage’ (Case C-386/02 Baldinger [2004] ECR I-8411, Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 
para 47). 
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nationality to third country nationals now appear to fall within the scope of Union 
law. The precise scope of the requirement is at present, however, far from clear. Do 
the principle of proportionality and the principle of legitimate expectations require, 
for instance, that a Member State grant its nationality to third country nationals 
long time resident on its territory? And does the Commission have the power to 
bring an infringement action against a Member State whose criteria for the 
acquisition of nationality appear contrary to certain fundamental rights? An oft-
discussed case in this connection is the nationality legislation of Estonia and Latvia, 
which makes it very hard for Russian-speaking minorities to acquire the nationalities 
of these countries.35 The Commission has in the past expressed its concern over this 
situation, but it has never taken concrete action. 36 The Union institutions have so 
far adopted a low profile in nationality matters, given the traditional view that 
Union law had no say in these matters. The increasing importance of Union 
citizenship and the bold case law of the ECJ just discussed may lead to a more 
proactive approach on their part in the near future. 
 
At the same time it must be emphasised that the Rottmann judgment in no way 
changes the fact that the Member States remain exclusively competent to adopt the 
rules on acquisition and loss of nationality. The Court in Rottmann only confirmed 
that this competence has to be exercised in accordance with Union law as far as 
situations falling within the scope of Union law are concerned. This holding has 
nothing extraordinary in itself. The same duty to comply with Union law applies in 
other fields falling outside the Union’s regulatory competence, such as inter alia, 
criminal legislation,37 direct taxation,38 rules governing a person’s name,39 and the 
organisation of social security schemes40. The Court’s reasoning on the scope of 
Union law, by contrast, was very innovative. This will be discussed in more detail in 
the following point.  
 
3. INTER-STATE MOVEMENT 
 
3.1 Traditional Approach  
 
It is trite law that Union law is only applicable to situations which fall within the 
scope of Union law. Traditionally, it has consistently been held that the situation of 
a Union citizen falls within the scope of Union law only where a link with two or 
more Member States –often referred to as a ‘cross-border dimension’ or ‘inter-State 
element’– is present.41 This link is most commonly provided by the fact that a Union 
citizen has exercised his right to free movement by moving from his home Member 
State to another Member State. In other words, movement between two Member 
States allows a Union citizen to bring his situation within the scope of Union law. 
This entitles the citizen concerned to invoke the right to equal treatment in the host 
Member State. Conversely, the home Member State is precluded from treating a 
                                                 
35 See the discussion in Annelies Lottmann, ‘No Direction Home: Nationalism and Statelessness in the 
Baltics’ (2008) 43 Tex. Int'l L.J. 503-520.  
36 See Fifth Report from the European Commission of 15 February 2008 on Citizenship of the Union, 
COM(2008)85 final, 2.  
37 See eg Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195, para 19. 
38 See eg Case C-520/04 Turpeinen [2006] ECR I-10685, para 11.  
39 See eg Case C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul [2008] ECR I-7639, para 16. 
40 See eg Case C-135/99 Elsen [2000] ECR I-1049, para 33. 
41 For a discussion, see Spaventa, ‘Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union 
Citizenship and its Constitutional Effects’ (2008) 45 CML Rev. 13-45.  
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national less favourably on ground of the fact that he has exercised his right to free 
movement.42 However, the ECJ has been prepared to give a lenient interpretation to 
the inter-State element. Accordingly, movement between Member States was not 
always required by the Court. In Zhu and Chen, for instance, the fact that a Union 
citizen resided in a Member State other than her Member State of nationality 
sufficed to bring her situation within the scope of Union law.43 In Schempp, the Court 
even considered that Union law was applicable in a situation in which not the Union 
citizen himself but his spouse had exercised her right to free movement.44  
 
In all the situations mentioned, the Court considered a sufficient inter-State element 
to be present because the applicant in each case could point at a link with two or 
more specific Member States. Cases where such a link is not present, by contrast, are 
traditionally considered to be ‘purely internal’ situations, in which no reliance on 
Union law is possible. Consequently, the traditional approach followed in the case 
law gives rise to instances of ‘reverse discrimination’, i.e. Union citizens who find 
themselves in a purely internal situation being treated less favourably than Union 
citizens who can demonstrate a sufficient link with Union law.45 The reason is that 
Union citizens in a purely internal situation cannot rely on the rights conferred by 
Union free movement law, but only on the possibly less favourable rights conferred 
by the national law of their Member State of residence. Instances of reverse 
discrimination do not infringe the Union principle of non-discrimination because the 
latter is not applicable to purely internal situations.  
 
3.2 Developments Regarding Purely Internal Situations  
 
The traditional approach towards the required link with Union law has been fiercely 
criticised, in particular because it entails the possibility for reverse discrimination.  It 
is sometimes argued that such is incompatible with the concept of the internal 
market as an ‘area without internal frontiers’46 because in a true internal market the 
crossing of a border between Member States should not be a relevant distinguishing 
factor for the application of Union law.47 More broadly, the traditional approach can 
be said to be contrary, for the same reason, to the idea of the Union as an ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement 
of persons is ensured’.48 Besides, the traditional approach is sometimes said to be at 
odds with the provisions on Union citizenship.49 In this connection it is argued that 
the distinction drawn in the case law between Union citizens who can demonstrate 
                                                 
42 See eg Case C-192/05 Tas-Hagen and Tas [2006] ECR I-10451.  
43 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. 
44 Case C-403/03 Schempp [2005] ECR I-6421.  
45For a critical analysis of the doctrine, see, inter alia, Alina Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EC 
Law (Kluwer Law International 2009) 271 pp.; Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Free movement of persons and 
the wholly internal rule: time to move on?’ (2002) 39 CML Rev. 731-771; Miguel Poiares Maduro, 
‘The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Reverse Discrimination and Purely Internal 
Situations’ in Claire Kilpatrick, Tonia Novitz and Paul Skidmore (eds), The Future of Remedies in 
Europe (Hart Publishing 2000) 117-140. 
46 See art 26(2) TFEU. 
47 This idea was cogently put forward, inter alia, in Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira, ‘Is Reverse 
Discrimination Still Permissible Under the Single European Act?’ in Th. M. De Boer (ed), Forty Years 
On: The Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in Europe (Kluwer 1990) 71-86. See also Joined 
Cases 80/85 and 159/85 Edah [1986] ECR 3359, Opinion of AG Mischo. 
48 See art 3(2) TEU. 
49 See inter alia, Alina Tryfonidou, ‘Reverse Discrimination in Purely Internal Situations: An 
Incongruity in a Citizens' Europe’ (2008) 35 L.I.E.I. 43-67; Nic Shuibhne (n 45), 731-771. See also 
Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union - A Legal Analysis’ (2007) 13 E.L.J. 591-610. 
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an even tenuous inter-State element and those who cannot is arbitrary and that 
Union citizenship should, as the most fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States, embody a guarantee to equal treatment of Union citizens regardless of any 
further link with Union law. Accordingly, in the most extreme version of this 
argument, all instances of reverse discrimination of Union citizens should be held in 
violation of Union law. 
 
Despite these longstanding criticisms, the ECJ has consistently repeated the ‘wholly 
internal rule’ and has refused to apply Union law to situations which do not present 
a link with two or more specific Member States. The Court’s position is grounded on 
the need to respect the division of competences between the Union and the Member 
States. Union law has a limited scope of application and cannot be relied on, 
therefore, in situations that fall outside this scope. However, it does not necessarily 
follow that Union law, and the provisions on the free movement of Union citizens in 
particular, do not apply in situations lacking a link with two or more specific 
Member States.50 It would be possible to accept a more abstract link with the Union 
Legal order as a sufficient link with Union law. A number of Advocate-Generals, 
most notably Advocate-General Sharpston, have made suggestions which go in that 
direction.51 In a number of very recent cases, the Court seems to have adopted for 
the first time a similar reasoning, be it in a highly nuanced form and restricted to a 
limited set of circumstances. In these cases, the Court appears to have accepted 
Union citizenship in itself as a sufficient link with Union law, thereby applying 
Union law in situations hitherto considered to be purely internal. 
 
3.2.1 Member State Nationality 
 
The first revolutionary case concerning the link required with Union law is the 
Rottmann case discussed above. In its judgment, the Court did not examine whether 
the traditional requirement of an inter-State element was satisfied, even though such 
appeared to be the case in the circumstances before the Court. As AG Poiares 
Maduro explained in his Opinion to the case, Mr. Rottmann had exercised his right 
to free movement by moving from Austria to Germany and this exercise, indirectly, 
gave rise to the disadvantage suffered, namely the loss of the status of Union citizen 
and the attached rights.52 The Court decided to take a different approach however, 
holding that the situation fell within the scope of Union law ‘by reason of its nature 
and its consequences’. Accordingly, the Court accepted Member State nationality 
and the possible loss thereof, given the inextricable links with Union citizenship, as 
sufficient in itself to consider the withdrawal of nationality as falling within the 
scope of Union law. Any further connection with Union law appeared unnecessary 
for the situation to fall within the scope of Union law.  
 
This approach is very innovative. Although the Court confirmed that Union law 
only applies to situations presenting a link with Union law, it conceptualised this 
                                                 
50 It must be remarked that, in any event, a number of provisions on Union citizenship apply 
regardless of such a link. This is the case for the right to petition the European Parliament, the right 
to apply to the Ombudsman and the right to write to any of the institutions or bodies of the Union in 
an official language and have an answer in the same language (see art 24 TFEU). 
51 See Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] ECR I-1683, Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 112-157; Case C-34/09 Ruiz 
Zambrano, Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 67-122. For an earlier example, see Case C-214/94 
Boukhalfa [1996] ECR I-2253, Opinion of AG Léger, para 63. 
52 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, paras 11-13. 
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link in a different way. It did not require a link with two specific Member States, but 
rather a more abstract link with the Union legal order. This abstract link was 
offered by Union citizenship. Indeed, each national measure affecting the Union 
citizenship status of an individual will automatically affect his most fundamental 
status under Union law and entail potential consequences for all the Member States. 
 
It could be wondered to what extent the outcome of the judgment was predicated on 
the facts of the case. The fact should not be overlooked that in Rottmann the Court 
was confronted with a situation in which, due to the lack of coordination between the 
nationality laws of two Member States, a person risked becoming stateless and 
losing his Union citizenship for having committed an offence which was in many 
ways not extraordinary. It could be suggested that the Court was principally 
concerned with avoiding these negative consequences from happening all too 
readily, and that the Court’s reasoning should not, therefore, be extrapolated to 
cases with a different set of circumstances. One could speculate that the fact that the 
nationality legislation of two specific Member States was at stake induced the Court 
to find that Union law was applicable.53 Besides, it is clear that Rottmann was a 
dispute about nationality rules. Nationality rules are a particular set of national rules 
because they directly regulate the access to Union citizenship and therefore 
determine the applicability of a significant part of the Union acquis. For that reason, 
one could argue that a dispute concerning nationality rules will by its very nature 
have a more significant link with the Union legal order than disputes concerning 
other sets of national rules. 
 
In my view, these observations relating to the specific circumstances of the Rottmann 
case are rather beside the point. It is clear from the Court’s reasoning that the crucial 
element in deciding that the situation fell within the ambit of Union law was the fact 
that the national measure threatened to cause the loss of the applicant’s Union 
citizenship and the enjoyment of the attached rights. Hence, the Court’s reasoning 
should be held to apply more broadly, even where only the legislation of one 
Member State is at stake. Moreover, it can apply to national rules outside the field of 
Member State nationality. This is clearly illustrated by the Ruiz Zambrano 
judgment.54 
 
3.2.2. Genuine Enjoyment of Union Citizenship Rights 
 
Mr. Ruiz Zambrano was a Colombian national who came to Belgium together with 
his Colombian spouse and their first child. Although his request for asylum was 
rejected by the Belgian authorities, he nevertheless remained in the country and 
even managed to become gainfully employed. He did not, however, satisfy the 
conditions under Belgian law for obtaining a residence permit or a work permit. The 
question to be answered by the ECJ was whether Mr. Ruiz Zambrano could derive a 
right of residence in Belgium from Union law and whether Union law would exempt 
him from the obligation to hold a work permit. The crucial element in this regard 
was that, during his stay in Belgium, Mr. Ruiz Zambrano’s spouse gave birth to a 
                                                 
53 This would appear from a literal reading of para 42 of the Rottmann judgment and, more in 
particular, of the phrase ‘after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that he originally 
possessed’. See the discussion in Gerard-René De Groot, ‘Invloed van het Unierecht op het 
nationaliteitsrecht van de Lidstaten: Overwegingen over de Janko Rottmann-beslissing van het 
Europees Hof van Justitie’ (2010) Asiel & Migratierecht 295-296.  
54 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano (ECJ, 8 March 2011), with case notes by Kay Hailbronner and Daniel 
Thym in (2011) 48 CML Rev. 1253-1270; Janek T. Nowak in (2011) Colum. J. Eur. L. 673-704. 
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second and third child, who acquired the Belgian nationality on grounds of their 
birth in Belgium.55 In Zhu and Chen the Court had ruled that a young Union citizen 
was entitled to be accompanied in the host Member State by the parent who is his or 
her primary carer.56 It seemed problematic, however, to apply an analogous 
reasoning to the facts of the Ruiz Zambrano case since, in contrast with baby Chen, 
the children of Mr. Ruiz Zambrano had never resided in a Member State other than 
that of their nationality. For that reason, it seemed that the situation of Mr. Ruiz 
Zambrano was a purely internal one, in which no reliance on Union law was 
possible. This point of view was defended before the ECJ by no less than eight 
Member States and by the Commission. 
 
The ECJ disagreed and held that Union law was applicable to the circumstances of 
the case. In a remarkably short judgment, the Court pointed out that the children of 
Mr. Ruiz Zambrano were undeniably Union citizens and that Union citizenship was, 
according to settled case law, the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States.57 Referring to paragraph 42 of the Rottmann judgment,58 the Court stated 
that Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have the effect of 
depriving Union citizens of the ‘genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’.59 The Court held that the 
refusal of a residence permit and of a work permit to a person in a situation like Mr. 
Ruiz Zambrano had precisely this effect. The reason was that a refusal of a residence 
permit would require Ruiz Zambrano’s children to accompany their parents to a 
third country. Similarly, the refusal of a work permit would entail the risk that Ruiz 
Zambrano would not have sufficient resources to provide for himself and his family, 
which would also result in the children having to leave the territory of the Union. In 
both circumstances, the children would, as a result, be unable to exercise the 
‘substance of the rights conferred on them by virtue of their status as Union 
citizens’.60 That outcome would be at variance with Article 20 TFEU. 
 
3.2.3 But not in All Circumstances?  
 
Although the Ruiz Zambrano judgment was remarkably short and lacking in 
elaborate reasoning,61 it did appear to confirm the landslide in the Court’s case law 
which was initiated with the Rottmann judgment. Indeed, the Court found Union law 
to be applicable despite the fact that the traditional requirement of an inter-State 
element was not satisfied. The Court accepted the fact that the national measure 
deprived a Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of his citizenship rights as a 
sufficient connection with Union law, regardless of any further such connection. The 
question which arose immediately after the judgment was how broadly the new 
approach of the Court will apply. The precise scope of the judgment was impossible 
to infer from its succinct wording. Some clarity was restored by the subsequent 
                                                 
55 Pursuant to art 10(1) of the Belgian Nationality Code, in the version applicable at that time, 
children born in Belgium acquired the Belgian nationality if they would otherwise be stateless. 
56 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925.  
57 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano (ECJ, 8 March 2011), paras 40-41. 
58 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-1449, para 42 (in which the Court held that the withdrawal 
of the applicant’s nationality in the circumstances of the case fell ‘by reason of its nature and its 
consequences’ within the ambit of Union law).  
59 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano (ECJ, 8 March 2011), para 42.  
60 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano (ECJ, 8 March 2011), paras 43-44. 
61 See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Seven questions for seven paragraphs’ (2011) 36 EL Rev. 162.  
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McCarthy case and Dereci and Others cases, in which the Court appears to have given 
a rather narrow interpretation to the reasoning followed in Ruiz Zambrano. 
 
The applicant in the McCarthy case, Mrs. McCarthy, held both the Irish and the UK 
nationality, but had lived her whole life in the UK. In 2002, she married a Jamaican 
national, who was not, however, entitled to reside in the UK in accordance with the 
British immigration rules. Relying on her Irish nationality, Mrs. McCarthy and her 
husband argued that they were entitled to residence on the basis of Union law, 
namely in their capacity of Union citizen and husband of a Union citizen, 
respectively. Mrs. McCarthy had never exercised her right to free movement and, 
consequently, her situation seemed to amount to a purely internal situation. Yet, 
such was far from certain after the Court’s judgment in Ruiz Zambrano. Moreover, 
the question arose whether the fact that Mrs. McCarthy possessed the nationality of 
another Member State than the Member State in which she resided could provide a 
sufficient link with Union law. Some earlier cases, the Garcia Avello case62 in 
particular, appeared to confirm that the possession of the nationality of two Member 
States was sufficient in order to enable a Union citizen to invoke Union law.  
 
Contrary to what some commentators had expected in view of the recent Ruiz 
Zambrano judgment, the Court ruled that Union law was not applicable in the 
circumstances of the case. According to the Court, Mrs. McCarthy could not invoke 
Article 21 TFEU because the contested national measure did not have the effect of 
depriving her of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of her citizenship rights or 
of impeding the exercise of her right of free movement and residence.63 The Court 
explicitly distinguished the circumstances of the McCarthy case from those at stake in 
Ruiz Zambrano. It held that, in contrast to the case of Ruiz Zambrano, the contested 
national measure did not have the effect of obliging Mrs McCarthy to leave the 
territory of the European Union. The fact that Mrs. McCarthy possessed the 
nationality of two Member States could not change anything with regard to these 
findings, as it did not trigger the application of national measures depriving her of 
the genuine enjoyment of the substance of her citizenship rights or impeding the 
exercise of her right of free movement and residence.64 
 
The Dereci and Others case provided the ECJ with an ideal opportunity to further 
clarify the scope of its holdings in Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy.65  The reference of 
the Austrian Verwaltungsgerichtshof in fact concerned five cases in which a third 
country family member66 of a static adult Austrian national were refused a right of 
residence in Austria.  The referring court wanted to know, essentially, whether these 
refusal decisions were precluded under Article 20 TFEU.  This required the ECJ to 
clarify whether such decisions were to be considered as having the effect of depriving 
the EU citizens concerned of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of their 
citizenship rights.  The ECJ firmly stated that this criterion is only satisfied in 
situations in which the EU citizen has, in fact, “to leave not only the territory of the 
Member State of which he is a national but also the territory of the EU as a whole”.67  
It emphasised that this criterion would only under exceptional circumstances 
                                                 
62 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613. 
63 Case C-434/09 McCarthy (ECJ, 5 May 2011), paras 44-56. 
64 Case C-434/09 McCarthy (ECJ, 5 May 2011), para 54. 
65 Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others (ECJ, 15 November 2011).  
66 Namely the spouse of an EU citizen in three cases and the adult children of an EU citizen in the two 
other cases. 
67 Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others (ECJ, 15 November 2011), para. 66. 
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preclude a refusal of a right of residence.  In this connection, the Court explained 
that the mere fact that it might appear desirable to an EU citizen, for economic 
reasons or in order to keep his family together, for his third country family members 
to be able to reside with him in the territory of the EU, is not sufficient in itself to 
support the view that the EU citizen will be forced to leave EU territory if such a 
right is not granted.68 
 
The picture resulting from the judgments just discussed is rather nuanced. In Ruiz 
Zambrano the Court departed from its traditional Union citizenship case law, which 
was centred on the presence or absence of an inter-State element. As a consequence, 
a large number of situations could seem to fall henceforth within the scope of Union 
law which would previously have fallen outside that scope. That would have drastic 
consequences for the vertical division of competences between the Union and the 
Member States. On a closer look, however, it seems that the judgment does not 
entail such wide consequences. As the Court clarified in McCarthy and Dereci and 
Others, it is willing to apply Union law only where the ‘substance of’ citizenship 
rights is at stake. In such circumstances an inter-State element will no longer be 
required. In essence, the Court is merely drawing the consequences from its 
Rottmann judgment. If a measure taking away one’s Union citizen status falls within 
the scope of Union law in the absence of a cross-border dimension, the same should 
be the case for a national measure completely rendering it impossible for someone to 
exercise the rights attached to that status. Put differently, national measures which 
de iure or de facto annihilate one’s Union citizenship should be treated equally and be 
held to fall within the scope of Union law even in the absence of a cross-border 
dimension.69   
 
It appears from these cases that the Court accepts that a refusal of a right of 
residence to the parent of a minor Union citizen makes it impossible for that citizen 
to exercise the substance of his citizenship rights. The impossibility for Mrs. 
McCarthy to be joined by her husband, by contrast, did not have this consequence 
because it did not oblige her to leave the territory of the Union.70 The same was 
true, presumably, for the applicants in Dereci and Others.71 Consequently, the Court 
appears to limit its extensive interpretation of the scope of Union law to children 
who face the impossibility to be joined by their parent(s).  
 
Two observations may explain the Court’s narrow interpretation. First, it must be 
pointed out that Union law has traditionally paid special attention to the position of 
young children.72 Already in previous cases, the impossibility for children to reside 
independently in a Member State appears to have inspired the Court to recognise for 
their family members more extensive rights than those enjoyed by family members 
                                                 
68 Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others (ECJ, 15 November 2011), paras 67-68. 
69 Nathan Cambien, ‘Case Note: Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano’ (2011) Sociaal-economische wetgeving 
410-43.  
70 Case C-434/09 McCarthy (ECJ, 5 May 2011), para 50. 
71 Somewhat curiously the Court in Dereci and Others did not make a final assessment of compliance 
with Article 20 TFEU, explicitly leaving this to the referring court (Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others 
(ECJ, 15 November 2011), para. 74). Yet the Court’s emphasis on the limited applicability of Article 
20 TFEU vis-à-vis static EU citizens and on the fact that Ruiz Zambrano concerned the right of 
residence of a third country national with dependent minor children clearly indicate that it was of the 
opinion that the applicants’ argument under EU law would not succeed. 
72 See eg art 12 of Regulation 1612/68 and, more recently, art 24 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. 
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of other Union citizens.73 Second, the Court’s holding in Ruiz Zambrano is arguably 
implicitly based on considerations relating to the need to respect fundamental rights, 
the right to respect for family life in particular. The relevant case law of the ECtHR 
is also more restrictive as far as minors are concerned.74  
 
3.3 Consequences for the Member States’ Immigration Laws  
 
The foregoing makes it clear that the classic inter-State requirement will no longer 
apply in some cases involving Union citizenship. Union citizens who are confronted 
with a national measure de iure or de facto taking away the genuine enjoyment of 
their Union citizenship rights will be able to invoke Union law against their home 
Member State, even in the absence of a link with any other Member State. This 
development in the case law can have significant consequences for the immigration 
laws of the Member States.  
 
On the one hand, Member States will have to accord some categories of their static 
nationals exactly the same rights regarding family reunification as are conferred by 
Union law on moving Union citizens. At present, this duty applies with certainty to 
young Union citizens. They should be accorded the right to reside in their home 
Member State together with their parent primary carer. Consequently, Member 
States which deny this right to static nationals will have to change their legislation. 
This is important in those Member States which accord their static nationals a right 
to family reunifications under more burdensome conditions than those applicable to 
other Union citizens.75 In Belgium, for instance, a recent legislative proposal 
introduces more burdensome rights for static nationals when compared to other 
Union citizens, but makes an exception for minor children and their parents.76 
However, many uncertainties remain concerning the exact scope of the new case law. 
First of all, it is not exactly clear precisely what categories of static nationals have to 
be accorded the said residence rights. For instance, must adult Union citizens who 
are dependent on a primary carer be equalled with young dependent Union citizens 
in this connection?77 Besides, it is not clear whether Member States may, under the 
circumstances mentioned, refuse to accord a right to a Union citizen and their 
primary carer by relying on a legitimate Member State interest78 and whether they 
may impose conditions relating to self-sufficiency79. These uncertainties will 
hopefully be settled by future cases.80   
 
                                                 
73 See, most recently, Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065 and Case C-480/08 Teixeira 
[2010] ECR I-1107 (see also the discussion under IV.B., infra). 
74 Hailbronner and Thym (n 54), 1268, referring to Maslov vs. Austria ECHR 2008 1638-03, paras 70-
72.  
75 See the overview in Anne Walter, Reverse Discrimination and Family Reunification (Wolf Legal 
Publishers 2008) 78 pp. 
76 See the discussion in Nathan Cambien, ‘Mogen statische Unieburgers worden gediscrimineerd? 
Enkele beschouwingen bij Ruiz Zambrano en McCarthy’ (2011) Tijdschrift voor Vreemdelingenrecht 
242-253. 
77 One can think, for instance, of disabled persons who need the presence of a primary carer (see in 
this context: Case C-303/06 Coleman [2008] ECR I-05603). 
78 The Court did not explicitly consider this point in Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy or Dereci and Others, 
but one could argue that the parallel drawn by the Court with the Rottmann judgment leaves open the 
possibility that a refusal to accord a right of residence might in certain circumstances be justified. 
79 See the discussion under IV, infra 
80 A substantial number of references have already been made to the Court, asking for further 
clarification of the Ruiz Zambrano and McCarthy judgments. See, for instance, pending cases C-356/11 
O and S and C-357/11 L, lodged on 7 July 2011. 
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On the other hand, this development will likely influence the criteria for the 
acquisition of nationality in the Member States. As was pointed out higher, it 
arguably follows from the Rottmann judgment that these criteria have to comply 
with Union law, even in situations in which no inter-State element is present. 
Moreover, the generous interpretation by the Court of the rights accruing to certain 
categories of static Union citizens and their third country family members, creates 
an incentive to restrict the criteria for the acquisition of nationality. It appears from 
the interventions of a large number of Member States in high profile cases before the 
Court that most Member States resist a wide interpretation of the Union citizenship 
provisions because they fear that such will render it impossible for them to control 
immigration, resulting in significant and uncontrollable financial burdens.81 After 
the Ruiz Zambrano judgment, third country nationals who manage to obtain the 
nationality of a Member State for their child can claim a right of residence in that 
State as the primary carers of that child. As such, the judgments could result in an 
enormous increase in claims for residence permits. In order to prevent this scenario 
from happening too easily, Member States will probably restrict the possibilities for 
acquiring their nationality, thereby restricting the possibilities for Union citizenship 
based residence claims. A case in point is the Belgian nationality legislation, which 
was restricted in the context of a number of claims similar to the one in Ruiz 
Zambrano.82 At the same time, it must be remarked that such restrictions are only 
valid as long as they do not contravene certain fundamental principles of Union law, 
such as the principle of legitimate expectations.  
 
The potentially significant consequences of the wide interpretation of the Union 
citizenship provisions for the immigration laws and policies of the Member States is 
also cogently illustrated by the cases discussed under the next title, relating to the 
self-sufficiency requirement. 
 
4. REQUIREMENT OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
 
4.1.  Traditional Residence Requirements  
 
As was remarked higher, the conditions surrounding the right to free movement and 
residence are now comprehensively laid down in Directive 2004/38, which repeals 
earlier directives governing the free movement and residence rights of specific 
categories of Union citizens and their family members.83 The Directive also replaces 
a number of provisions of Regulation 1612/68 on the free movement of workers.84 It 
must be emphasised, however, that the latter Regulation was not repealed. Some of 
its key provisions remain in force. This is the case, for instance, for Article 12, which 
grants children of a migrant worker the right to access to education in the host 
Member State under the same conditions as nationals of that State. That provision 
has been interpreted by the ECJ as granting a right of residence to school-going 
                                                 
81 See eg Case C-127/08 Metock and Others [2008] ECR I-6241, paras 71-72. 
82 Whereas traditionally the Belgian Nationality Code provided that a child born in Belgium acquired 
the Belgian nationality if it would otherwise be stateless, after an amendment in 2006 such is no 
longer the case ‘if, by appropriate administrative action instituted with the diplomatic or consular 
authorities of the country of nationality of the child’s parent(s), the child’s legal representative(s) can 
obtain a different nationality for it’. 
83 See the discussion in Anastasia Iliopoulou, ‘Le nouveau droit de séjour des citoyens de l'Union et 
des membres de leur famille: la directive 2004/38/CE’ (2004) RDUE 523-557. 
84 Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for 
workers within the Community [1968] JO L257/2. 
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children of migrant workers which is independent from the right of residence of 
their parents. 85 I will come back to this point below. 
 
The central conditions stated in Directive 2004/38 are those relating to the financial 
situation of the Union citizen. Union citizens are only entitled to reside in the host 
Member State for more than three months if they are either economically active or 
have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members not to become a 
burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State and have 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover in that State.86 The underlying idea is that 
Union citizens can only move to another Member State if they are financially 
independent, in order to avoid moving Union citizens and their family members 
becoming a burden for the social assistance system of the host Member State. This 
condition of self-sufficiency can, like the possession of Member State nationality and 
the inter-State element, be labelled a classic element of the free movement of Union 
citizens. However, this element too has to be nuanced in view of recent case law of in 
which the ECJ has recognised a right of residence for certain categories of Union 
citizens, despite the fact that they did not at all fulfil the requirements regarding 
self-sufficiency.87 
 
4.2.  The Ibrahim and Teixeira Cases and their Consequences  
 
4.2.1 The Cases 
 
The facts of the Ibrahim and Teixeira cases are very similar.88 The applicants in both 
cases entered the UK as the spouse of a Union migrant worker, together with their 
children. Consequently, both women separated from their husband and continued to 
live in the UK independently, together with their children. At some point in time, 
both women applied for housing assistance for themselves and for their children. 
Their application was rejected because, according to the competent UK authority, 
they were not entitled to reside in the UK under Union law.89 This view was based 
on the fact that the applicants were not self-sufficient or covered by comprehensive 
sickness insurance and depended on social assistance to cover the living expenses of 
themselves and their children. In both cases, the applicants submitted, however, that 
they did derive a right of residence under Union law from the fact that they were the 
primary carer of school-going children.   
 
                                                 
85 Inter alia Joined Cases 389/87 and 390/87 Echternach and Moritz [1989] ECR 723; Case C-413/99 
Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091. 
86 See art 7 of Directive 2004/38. Students only have to ‘assure’ the host Member State that they have 
sufficient resources for themselves and their family members (see art 7(1)c). 
87 In earlier cases the Court had already adopted a restrictive interpretation of the possibilities for 
Member States to impose these requirements, inter alia by holding that they have to be interpreted in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality (Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091, 
para 91). 
88 Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065; Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, with 
case notes by Matthew Starup and Peter Elsmore in (2010) 35 EL Rev. 571-1160; Charlotte O'Brien in 
(2011) 48 CML Rev. 203-225. The most important factual difference between the two cases was that 
Ms. Ibrahim was a third country national, whereas Ms. Texeira was a Union citizen who had 
previously been employed in the UK. Furthermore, Teixeira’s daughter was over 18 years old, 
whereas Ibrahim’s children were young minors.   
89 It follows from the Housing Act 1996 and the Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Eligibility) 
Regulations 2006 that a person is not eligible for housing assistance unless he has a right of residence 
in the United Kingdom conferred by Union law (Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 
14). 
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The ECJ essentially confirmed its holding in Baumbast and R and held that the 
primary carer of school-going children was entitled to reside in the host Member 
State for the period of his or her children’s education. It confirmed that school-going 
children of a (former) migrant worker derive an independent right of residence from 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68.90 Furthermore, it explained that, precisely in 
order to guarantee the effectiveness of this independent right of residence, residence 
rights must be extended to the primary carer of these children, without whom the 
latter cannot realistically exercise this right. The Court was prepared to go far in its 
protection of the effet utile of the residence rights of school-going children and their 
primary carer by holding, first, that these residence rights were not subject to the 
conditions regarding self-sufficiency. The Court held, moreover, that these residence 
rights cannot be made subject to a condition of age. Accordingly, the primary carer 
of a school-going child is entitled to reside in the host Member State even after that 
child reaches the age of majority for as long as the child continues to need his 
presence and care in order to be able to pursue and complete his or her education. 
 
4.2.2 Analysis 
 
The Ibrahim and Texeira cases confirm that school-going children of a (former) 
migrant worker and their primary carer derive a right of residence in the host 
Member State, even if they are not self-sufficient. This outcome is surprising in view 
of the fact that Directive 2004/38, which codifies the rules on the free movement of 
persons, mentions no such right.91 One could have expected the Court to hold that 
the Directive, which to a large extent incorporates predating ECJ case law92, has 
implicitly overruled Baumbast and R. Still, as the Court correctly pointed out, one 
cannot ignore the fact that the Directive did not repeal Article 12 of Regulation 
1612/68, in contrast with Articles 10 and 11 of that Regulation. This probably 
means that the Union legislator did not intend to change the meaning and 
consequences of that provision. As the Court pointed out in Ibrahim and Teixeira, if 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 could no longer be interpreted as conferring a 
right of residence on school-going children and their primary carer but only as 
conferring the right to equal treatment with regard to access to education, it would 
have become superfluous with the entry into force of Directive 2004/38, which lays 
down in its Article 24(1) a general right to equal treatment, which is applicable to 
access to education. Besides, one can agree with the Court that the aim of that 
Directive is inter alia to simplify and strengthen the right of free movement and 
residence of all Union citizens93 and that it must not be interpreted therefore as a 
‘step back’ as far as the rights of school-going children and their primary carer are 
concerned.  
 
                                                 
90 Accordingly, the Court held that that right is not lost where the parents of the children concerned 
have meanwhile divorced, and that the fact that only one parent is a Union citizen and the fact that 
that parent has ceased to be a migrant worker in the host Member State are irrelevant in this regard 
(Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 29 and Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-
1107, para 37, referring to Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R [2002] ECR I-7091, para 63). 
91 Except under the exceptional circumstances foreseen by art 12(3) of the Directive (see also text to n 
104).  
92 This appears from a number of recitals in the preamble to the Directive (see inter alia recitals 9 and 
27). See also Samantha Currie, ‘EU Migrant Children, their Primary Carers and the European Court 
of Justice: Access to Education as a Precursor to Residence under Community Law’ (2009) 16 Journal 
of Social Security Law 81. 
93 See recital 3 in the preamble to the Directive. 
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The Court based the residence rights for school-going children and their primary 
carer on Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68. Since that Article does not explicitly 
confer such rights, the question arises, again, exactly what categories of persons can 
invoke the said rights. The Court’s case law gives a number of important clues. 
 
a. Residence Rights for School-going Children 
 
The first category of persons deriving a right of residence from Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68 are children of a migrant worker who have resided with him in 
the host Member State for a certain period of time. These children will normally 
derive their initial residence right in that Member State from their status of family 
member of a migrant worker. Once they start schooling in the host Member State, 
however, they acquire an independent right of residence for the duration of their 
education. In this regard it is not required that their parent had the status of migrant 
worker on the date on which the child started its education.94 Moreover, the 
children’s right of residence does not end when their parent stops working or when 
they no longer live together with this parent. Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 
applies to all types of education, including higher education and university 
education. Accordingly, school-going children continue to enjoy a right of residence 
when they attain the age of majority and for as long as their schooling lasts, even if 
they are not financially dependent on their parents. Consequently, their right of 
residence extends even further than the residence rights enjoyed by children in the 
host Member State in their capacity as family members of a Union citizen. The latter 
category only enjoys a right of residence if they are under 21 years old or 
dependent.95 
 
b. Residence Rights for the Primary Carer 
 
The second category deriving a right of residence from Article 12 of Regulation 
1612/68 are primary carers of school-going children. Naturally, this right too only 
lasts as long as the child’s schooling continues. Moreover, the Court has ruled that 
this right will normally end when the child reaches the age of majority, unless the 
child continues to need the presence and care of that parent in order to be able to 
pursue and complete his or her education.96  
 
The Court recognised the residence right just mentioned only for the parent who is 
the primary carer of his children. The Court’s reasoning could presumably, however, 
also apply to other categories of primary carers, for instance where the primary carer 
of a child is not his parent but another family member or even a non-family member 
like a legal guardian. 97 Indeed, the very reason for which the Court recognised a 
right of residence on behalf of the primary carer is that such is necessary in order to 
guarantee the effet utile of the right to education of the children concerned. Prima 
facie it cannot be seen why this effet utile should not be guaranteed if the primary 
                                                 
94 Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, paras 71-75. 
95 See art 2(2) of Directive 2004/38. The dependency condition is interpreted by the Court as 
referring to financial dependency (see Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] ECR I-1, para 35 and the case law 
cited). 
96 Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, paras 84-87. 
97 Interesting to note is that the Court in some paragraphs refers to the person who is the primary 
carer of children (eg Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, para 31). 
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carer is not the parent of the child concerned.98 A broad interpretation can further be 
based on the need to comply with the right to respect for family life99. Furthermore, 
the possibility cannot be excluded that a child has multiple primary carers, who 
should be accorded a right of residence on the basis of Article 12.100 
 
An interesting question is whether the primary carer is entitled to equal treatment 
in the host Member State.101 Directive 2004/38 confers the right to equal treatment 
on both Union citizens and their family members, with certain derogations for inter 
alia students (see Article 24). However, this right only applies to persons ‘residing 
on the basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State’ (see Article 
24(1)). The residence right of the primary carer is not, however, based on the 
Directive, but on Regulation 1612/68. One could assume therefore that primary 
carers cannot invoke the Union principle of equal treatment in order to claim access 
to social assistance, for instance. However, that view is not tenable in the light of the 
reasoning followed by the Court in Ibrahim and Teixeira. The conferral of a right of 
residence on the primary carer without at the same time conferring a right to equal 
treatment would put in peril the effet utile of the residence rights of the children, as is 
clearly illustrated by the facts of these cases. In both cases the mother primary carer 
was jobless and fully dependent on welfare benefits. It should be clear that, in the 
absence of a right to claim equal access to social assistance, the mother could not 
realistically reside with her children in the UK. Besides, it must be remarked that 
legal residence in the host Member State in accordance with the national laws of that 
State may enable a person to invoke the general principle of equal treatment laid 
down in Article 18 TFEU.102 
 
c. Children of Non-economically Active Persons and Their Primary Carer? 
 
It can be wondered whether the residence rights enjoyed by school-going children 
and their primary carer only pertain to children of (former) migrant workers. Does 
the case law discussed also apply to school-going children of other categories of 
Union citizens –like self employed persons or, more importantly still, non-
economically active Union citizens– and their primary carer? This question has no 
obvious answer. 
 
On the one hand, a strict reading of the Ibrahim and Teixeira cases leads to the 
conclusion that the question must be answered in the negative. Since Article 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68 only applies to migrant workers and their families, it seems not 
possible for children of other categories of Union citizens and their primary carer to 
rely on this case law. On the other hand, the reasoning followed by the Court 
provides some support for a positive answer. As was pointed out above, the Court’s 
main concern was to preserve the effet utile of the right of access to education for 
children of migrant workers. It should be clear that children of non-economically 
active Union citizens equally enjoy a right of access to education in the host Member 
                                                 
98 Annette Schrauwen, ‘Zelfstandig verblijfsrecht van schoolgaande kinderen van werknemers en hun 
verzorgers: ontbreken van bestaansmiddelen niet relevant’ (2010) Nederlands tijdschrift voor 
Europees recht 236.  
99 See in particular Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279 (in which the Court recognised a 
right of residence for the stepparent who was the primary carer of children of a Union citizen). 
100 Starup and Elsmore mention the possibility of recognising a ‘secondary carer’ besides the ‘primary 
carer’ (Starup and Elsmore (n 88), at 584).  
101 See also Schrauwen (n 98), at 236-237. 
102 See Case C-456/02 Trojani [2004] ECR I-7573.  
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State.103 It could be argued that, once such children have obtained a right of 
residence in the host Member State and attend school there, they should similarly 
obtain an independent right of residence for themselves and for their primary carer 
which cannot be made subject to restrictive conditions such as those concerning self-
sufficiency.  
 
In fact, the Union legislator has (partially) confirmed this point of view in Article 
12(3) of Directive 2004/38, to which the Court explicitly referred to support its 
reasoning in Ibrahim and Teixeira.104 That Article states: 
 
The Union citizen's departure from the host Member State or his/her death shall 
not entail loss of the right of residence of his/her children or of the parent who has 
actual custody of the children, irrespective of nationality, if the children reside in the 
host Member State and are enrolled at an educational establishment, for the purpose 
of studying there, until the completion of their studies. 
 
The right laid down in Article 12(3) applies to school-going children of all 
categories of Union citizens covered by Directive 2004/38 – i.e. economically active 
and non-economically active Union citizens – and is not subject to the classic 
residence conditions regarding self-sufficiency.105 However, Article 12(3) is only 
applicable in the event of death or departure of a Union citizen from the host 
Member State. It does not, on its face, apply in the case of a non-economically active 
Union citizen who continues to reside in the host Member State after no longer 
fulfilling the requisite conditions.106 All the same, it could be argued that the non-
application of the substance of Article 12(3) in such circumstances would undermine 
the aim pursued by that provision, namely safeguarding the right of access to 
education for school-going children of a Union citizen in the host Member State. 
One could argue, therefore, that the Court should adopt a wide interpretation of 
Article 12(3), going beyond its literal wording, and finding application in all 
circumstances where the Union citizen whose children attend an educational 
establishment in the host Member State loses his entitlement to residence in that 
State.107 In all such circumstances, the right of residence in the host Member State 
for the children concerned would continue until they finish their education. The 
same would be true for their primary carer, at least until they reach the age of 
majority.  
 
This reasoning is, of course, merely speculative. Strictly speaking, the Ibrahim and 
Texeira cases only apply to children of migrant workers. It is very well possible that 
the Court will refuse the wide interpretation suggested of Article 12(3) of Directive 
2004/38 for it goes against the apparent will of the legislator, who limited Article 
12(3) to cases of death or departure of the Union citizen concerned. Besides, the 
wider interpretation of Article 12(3) would take away much of the added value of 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, a provision which was preserved by the Union 
legislator even after the adoption of Directive 2004/38. Still, as was pointed out, it 
cannot be fully excluded that in future cases the Court will enlarge its holding to 
                                                 
103 See art 24 of Directive 2004/38, which also applies to access to education. 
104 See Case C-310/08 Ibrahim [2010] ECR I-1065, paras 57-58: Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] 
ECR I-1107, paras 68-69. 
105 This clearly ensues when art 12(3) is contrasted with arts 12(1) and (2) of the Directive. 
106 The most obvious example is that of a Union citizen who initially had sufficient resources and a 
comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State, but later lost one of these.  
107 See Starup and Elsmore (n 88), 583-584. 
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children of other categories of Union citizens and their primary carer. The Court has 
in past cases already been prepared to go past the strict wording of secondary Union 
law in order to guarantee the rights of Union citizens and their family members.108  
 
4.3 Consequences for the Member States’ Immigration Laws  
 
While the Ibrahim and Teixeira cases are perhaps less discussed than the Rottmann 
and Ruiz Zambrano cases, their consequences for the immigration policies of the 
Member States could be more far-reaching. Indeed, vis-à-vis school-going children 
of migrant workers and their primary carer(s) Member States cannot impose the 
traditional requirements regarding self-sufficiency. Such persons have to be accorded 
a right of residence and equal access to social benefits. The resulting financial 
burden for the Member States could potentially be enormous, as can be gathered 
when one looks at the facts of the Ibrahim case. Ms. Ibrahim’s husband had only 
worked for a very brief period in the host Member State.109 This sufficed for him to 
qualify as migrant worker and hence for his family members to invoke the provisions 
of Regulation 1612/68. Given the young age of his children, this could imply a right 
of residence for a substantial period of time for Ms. Ibrahim and her children, during 
which they could fully rely for their subsistence on welfare benefits. 
 
These consequences would be even more drastic if the reasoning is extended to 
school-going children of non-economically active Union citizens and their primary 
carer. As was pointed out higher, it cannot be totally excluded that the Court will do 
so in future case law. In that case all categories of Union citizens could, by moving 
to another Member State and enrolling their children in an educational 
establishment there, secure a right of continued residence in that State, even when 
they no longer satisfy the conditions regarding self-sufficiency.110 This would result 
in a much greater number of potential ‘welfare tourists’. Besides, granting an 
unconditional residence right to children of non-economically active Union citizens 
is more problematic from a financial point of view than granting such rights to 
children of migrant workers because the latter will in the past have contributed to 
the host Member State’s social assistance systems by paying taxes and social 
assistance contributions.111 This may be a further reason why the Court might in the 
future not be prepared to extend similar rights to school-going children of 
economically active Union citizens and their primary carer. If the Court should do so 
nevertheless, I submit, the ensuing financial consequences could be tempered by 
allowing sufficient scope to the Member States to tackle abuse of residence rights 
and by allowing Member States, in certain circumstances, to restrict the residence 
rights discussed to school-going children who are sufficiently integrated in their 
society.112 
                                                 
108 See eg Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. 
109 He had only been employed in the UK for a total of about eight months and had claimed incapacity 
benefits in the UK for an additional nine months.  
110 Non-economically active Union citizens should, in order to obtain an initial right of residence, 
demonstrate to have sufficient financial resources. Once such a right obtained, however, they could 
then derive a right of residence even when these conditions would no longer be fulfilled. 
111 See, in this sense, explicitly, Case C-480/08 Teixeira [2010] ECR I-1107, Opinion of AG Kokott, 
para 81. It must be remarked, however, that this contribution appears to have been very limited on 
the facts of, in particular, the Ibrahim case. This was not problematic according to AG Kokott since 
financial contributions are made by migrant workers ‘viewed as a group’ (Ibid.). 
112 The Court could draw inspiration from a line of cases in which it held such ‘integration’ 
requirements to be valid (see eg Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119 and the discussion in 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
As this article has demonstrated, recent ECJ case law brings important changes to 
three basic elements of the free movement of Union citizens, which I have labelled 
the ‘classics’ of free movement. In the first place, it seems that Union law will 
increasingly influence the nationality rules of the Member States. The traditional 
assumption that Member States are exclusively competent to regulate the personal 
scope of Union citizenship can no longer be maintained therefore. In the second 
place, the benefits of Union free movement law, in particular those relating to family 
reunification, can now in some circumstances be invoked by Union citizens even if 
they have never resided in a Member State other than that of their nationality. 
Consequently, the traditional assumption that Union law can only be invoked by 
Union citizens who have moved between Member States is no longer valid. Lastly, 
recent case law appears to diminish the importance of self-sufficiency as a condition 
for legal residence in another Member State for longer periods of time. 
 
There can be no doubt that the developments outlined will have significant 
consequences for the immigration laws and policies of the Member States. First, the 
Member States’ rules on acquisition and loss of nationality will increasingly be 
tested on their compliance with certain fundamental principles of Union law. This 
might reduce their margin of discretion, for instance, for refusing to confer their 
nationality on third country nationals. Second, Member States will have to accord 
certain categories of static nationals a right of residence together with certain of 
their close family members. Third country family members of a Member State 
national thereby derive greater claims for residence than were traditionally 
conferred on them under the immigration laws of some Member States. Lastly, 
Member States will have to accord certain categories of Union citizens from other 
Member States residence rights even if they are fully dependent for their subsistence 
on welfare benefits. The resulting financial burdens for the Member States are 
potentially very significant. 
 
It must be emphasised, however, that these remarkable evolutions in the ECJ case 
law on Union citizenship are in full development and that it is not yet possible 
therefore to ascertain their precise scope. Future case law will have to clarify the 
reach of the principles articulated by the Court in the recent cases discussed and 
make clear to what precise extent they reduce the discretion of the Member States in 
crafting their immigration policies. 
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